by John Zimmerman

The author a research analyst on Middle Eastern affairs, is at present writing a book on the Arab-Israeli conflict

Although the UN proposal to partition British-mandated Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state was not put to the vote until 29 November 1947, Arab radio stations had started their campaign of psychological warfare two months earlier.1 On 13 September, Radio Beirut quoted an Iraqi Independence Party statement that ` all Jews who have entered Palestine and other Arab countries after 1914 ' must be considered illegal immigrants ` who should be sent out of the country.'  Two days later it reported that the Premier of Trans-Jordan had called for the evacuation of all Zionists from Palestine. By October the tenor of these broadcasts had become more violent.  A number of Arab newspapers, it was announced, had appealed for volunteers to fight in the impending war for Islam and Arabism.2  Radio Damascus, on  22 October,  made perhaps the most bellicose statement during this period:

` God sent the Zionists to Palestine not to establish a Jewish home but just to make sure they would be killed by the Arabs. Providence sent the Zionists to Palestine to be exterminated by the Arabs.'

Two days after the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Arab League in Aley, Lebanon (7 October 1947), a military committee set up by them made the following recommendations in a secret report:

l. The armies of the Arab League to be stationed near the borders of Palestine. 2. League States immediately to purchase and store military equipment needed by the volunteers.
3. The Arab Air forces to be stationed close to the shores of the Mediterranean to prevent any assistance or reinforcements reaching the Jews from overseas.3

While these proposals were being considered, Arab radio stations began to boast of the League's military preparations for the coming  battle. On 11 October. Jerusalem's Sharq al -Adna radio announced that Syrian planes and infantry had begun manoeuvres on her Southwestern frontier with Palestine, while Radio Cairo reported that Egypt had given Saudi  Arabia permission to send troops through the Sinai Peninsula, and the Arab News Agency announced that Iraqi troops were advancing towards Palestine through Trans-Jordan.4 A Cairo broadcast of 22 October even reported the capture of Syrian soldiers inside Palestine.  All this, it should be remembered, was taking  place not only before any serious fighting  between Arabs and Jews had broken out, but also before the UN vote on partition. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that these incursions were undertaken as a move against the division of the country, for, as late as 26 November,  the Arab governments seemed confident that  the UN would reject partition.

Almost immediately after the decision to  partition Palestine, fighting broke out, though  it was still confined in the early phases to Palestine Arabs and Jews, the former  receiving encouragement and arms from  neighbouring states.5 The Jewish Agency  attributed these attacks to Arab hirelings rather than to the native Palestinians.6

Even though Arab armies did not join the  battle until 15 May 1948, government intervention by the neighbouring states began much earlier. Jerusalem Radio (an Arab station) reported on 10 January that an armed force  of about 600 fighters who had crossed the  Palestine-Syrian border and penetrated into  Jewish colonies had again retreated into Syria.7

The reason that Arab states preferred


to use irregular forces was, according to John Bagot Glubb, the commander of the Arab League, that  'the Arabs believed themselves to be a great military people and regarded the Jews as a nation of shopkeepers . . . They were persuaded that a force of irregulars would be sufficient.' 8 Their number has been estimated as between 5,000 and 7,000.

During the first stage of the confrontation, Arabs had indeed reason to be optimistic. Syrians, as the 10 January broadcast indicated, could penetrate into Palestine and then retreat without fear of retribution, since the Haganah, if it attempted to pursue the guerrillas across the border, would be accused of aggression. The borders moreover were protected by Arab armies, whose purpose, according to Radio Cairo, was to tighten their ring of steel around Palestine.9 Radio Damascus (10 February 1948) ridiculed the ` feverish activity' of the UN, which, it suggested, became active because the initiative had passed to the Arabs, even before they had deployed their full strength.

The Arabs were also confidently expecting support from non-Arab sympathizers. Radio Beirut (20 December 1947) reported that 6,000  British soldiers in the Middle East and a number of ex-members of Rommel's Africa Korps had offered to join the Arab ranks.l0  A little later; Radio Cairo (28 January 1948) could announce the delivery of the first shipment  of European armaments. Their origin was not disclosed; they may have been supplied by the British, who continued to subsidize Trans- Jordan's Arab Legion,11 or by Czechoslovakia, which had sold arms to the Syrians early in 1948. Although the US had voted for partition, some Arab radio stations believed America would supply them with arms; informed circles  in Cairo were convinced that the Palestine situation would improve because the oil lobby and the Pentagon were trying to reverse the decision on partition.12    During this period, the Jews remained on the defensive, but struck back on 31 March in an action which the UN Palestine commission described as a preventive measure to counter aggression.13 It appears that in the early stages of the confrontation, the  Arabs had tried to goad Jews into some kind of  offensive action. The Arab tactical objective-- according to Radio Damascus (12 February 1948), was to extend Jewish forces over as wide an area as possible in order to isolate Jewish communities ` that they may easily be wiped out.' The Arabs, believing in their superior fighting ability, apparently felt that the quickest way to victory was to provoke some kind of premature Jewish riposte.

On the day the Jewish offensive began (31 March 1948), Radio Beirut accused the Jews of bombing Arab cities: ` Our Arab brothers will be so provoked when Jewish planes bomb their cities that they will not be satisfied unless they  wreak vengeance ',    a    charge which Haganah Radio vehemently denied on the same day, dismissing it as an excuse to bomb Jewish centres of popuIation. Radio Jerusalem (I June 1948) repeated these accusations which both stations knew to be false, because emergent Israel simply lacked the air-power to mount such raids. The Egyptian air force, on the other hand, did bomb Tel Aviv and was none too particular where its bombs fell.

On 15 May, the day Israel came into existence, King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, according to Radio Beirut, declared that the Jews had no right in Palestine. On the following day, the Voice of Israel (formerly Haganah Radio)14 announced:

`Although we have been forced into a fierce war, we must not forget that within our boundaries members of the Arab people should enjoy the rights of citizens.'

The attitudes of both sides had changed little by June. Shortly before the first ceasefire was due to become effective, King Abdullah vowed, ` We will never agree to lift the siege of Jerusalem '.15 Israel had a different approach to Arab territory occupied before the first truce. The Voice of Israel (17 June 1948) said that Jews would not relinquish Arab areas ` except on special conditions: for instance, evacuation of the Egyptian army from the Negev, which is part of the Jewish state, and evacuation of the Trans-Jordan Army from the old city of Jerusalem, which is part of an international zone '. The Arabs rejected these terms and refused to extend the ceasefire which, agreed on 11 June, was to terminate on 8 July.

Before and after the emergence of Israel as an independent state, Arab broadcasts from

the Middle East attempted to construe parallels between Zionism and communism or Jews and Communists.16 On 2 February 1948 Sharq al Adna asserted that Russia planned to infiltrate half a million Communist agents into Palestine because Zionism was the secret ally of communism. Radio Cairo (16.2.48) hinted ominously that ` a Jewish Communist State in Palestine . . would have repercussions on Jews living in other Arab countries'. Radio Damascus (31.3.48) described Zionism as the twin brother of communism, while Radio Beirut (18.4.48) quoted King Abduliah as saying that his army would ` fight the Jewish Communist menace confronting the Arab world '.  The same station (31.7.48) alleged that most Jewish immigrants from East European countries who had entered Palestine during World War II were members of the Communist Party.

To the Moslems of the forties, the materialistic and anti-religious doctrines of communism were anathema. The anti-Jewish riots of 1921 were due to Arab fears that immigrant Jews were Bolshevik infiltrators. a suspicion eagerly exploited by Nazi propaganda in the Middle East which apparently misled even Ernest Bevin, Britain's Foreign Secretary.

Predictably, Arab stations extolled the alleged exploits of the Palestinian irregulars preceding the Arab armies. Fawzi Kawakji. the leader of the Arab Liberation Army, broadcast over the movement's Al Inqaz radio station ( 1 1-4-48) lurid accounts of its successes: `Black smoke biends with red fire shooting to t the sky from burned Jewish colonies in the north and south . . . With terror and fear the Zionists look through the windows of their demolished forts and houses.'

In the week before the Arab armies started to invade Palestine, a sustained effort was made to whip up enthusiasm among the Arab masses for the impending jihad (holy war). On 8 May, the Voice of Palestine began its broadcast with a poem on the need to place all Jews in Arab countries under strict supervision, proclaiming: ` Jews are the enemies of both Moslems and
Christians . . . and the dregs of the nations . . . Jews, those despicable cowards who, as everyone knows, have betrayed their Prophet, those pariahs who sell their souls and their honour for filthy lucre . . . They slay


children and mutilate their bodies, and are cowardly enough to murder old and helpless Arabs.' Similarly the New Arab Secret Radio (10.5.48) warned: ` You will perish as quickly as twigs . . . Soon the sons of the Pharaoh . . . will come to you from the Nile Valley and teach you the meaning of suffering and torture . . Jews, you will soon face the brave and noble Arabs . . . Prepare yourselves to die.'

When, by June and July, the war was not going as well as the Arabs had expected, the position of the Jewish communities in the Middle East deteriorated and they were increasingly regarded as hostages on whom an otherwise frustrated populace could conveniently vent its anger. Before the intervention of the Arab irregulars in January 1948, a number of Arab radio stations gave considerable prominence to statements in which the Grand Rabbi of Cairo was said to have praised the Egyptian Government, assuring it that  Egyptian Jews were standing behind their Moslem brothers; that Syrian Jews not only supported the Arab cause but were also joining the Arab Liberation Army; and that Jews had contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Arab war effort.17 However; by  7 June the tone had changed:

` The Jews blow up and destroy buildings in the Jaffa Arab quarter . . Only confiscation of the Jews' property in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt will serve. Arab buildings will be repaired and expenses paid with money confiscated from the Jews. Since they blow up and destroy buildings; when it is in their interests, they will only  get what they deserve.' 18

The following month, Radio Cairo (28.7.48) quoted the Arab Christian leader, Bishop Hakim, as saying that `Arab countries are now studying a proposal to use the money of Middle Eastern Jews for the [Palestinian] refugees'. Neither Radio Cairo nor any other monitored radio station denied Hakim's assertions. Nor was this one of those merely rhetorical threats of which the Arabs are alleged to be so inordinately fond. Eventually more than 90% of all Oriental Jews were driven from their homelands, although the property they had to leave behind was never put at the disposal of the Palestinian refugees. The bulk of the Jewish stations' Arabic transmissions addressed themselves, initially at least, to the Palestinian Arabs. Attempts were made to discredit the Arab leadership by implying that they were collaborating with the British. 19

Both the Arab leadership and the British, it was asserted, were bound to bring ruin on the Palestinians by their attempts to impose perpetual tutelage on the country. This subject was harped upon more persistently in the hope of discouraging the Palestinians from helping the Arab irregulars. Haganah Radio warned that outside Arab intervention would only give the East and West an excuse to intervene. `This means that Palestine and the Arab East ' would become merely an object of great power  politics.' On 17 July, the Voice of Israel suggested that Arabs and Jews should get  together to rid the East of imperialism.

Similarly, on 27 March, Irgun's radio station emphasized that the Arabs fighting in Palestine were paid agents protecting British interests. A Stern Gang broadcast (3.6.48) stated that the  British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was  angry because he feared that the Jewish community might serve the `Arab worker and fellah'  as an example and inspire him to  improve his condition.

Jewish stations also sought to inform Arabs of the inconsistencies and internecine feuding their leaders had to face. On the other hand, Haganah Radio (17.3.48) told its Arab listeners that whenever it reported corruption and rivalries it was only motivated by its ` deep respect' for the ordinary Arab people.  Corruption had indeed assumed such proportions that even Arab broadcasts began to denounce it. According to Radio Baghdad (9.9.48) money for the liberation of Palestine, originally entrusted to a few highly respected and well-known men, had found its way into the hands of a number of people who were living lavishly on it `
without doing anything for Palestine.'  The Jewish newspapers, Radio Haganah (6.4.48)  asserted, unlike their Arab competitors, would not exaggerate victories. This policy of objective reporting apparently paid off, for Arabs were ordered not to listen to the broadcasts. ` This is [according to Radio Haganah (6.4.48)] because Arab leaders are afraid of seeing the population informed as to the true state of affairs.'

During the latter stages of the war, Jewish broadcasts broadened their appeal to include the Arab armies as well as the Palestinians. The Israelis sought to hasten the Arab defeat by assuring the soldiers of honourable treatment if they surrendered. The Station of Arab War Prisoners (11.11.48) broadcast the following appeal, allegedly signed by Egyptian prisoners of
war, to the Arab armies:

` Rumours and reports stating that Jewish forces kill, torture and ill-treat prisoners . . . are nothing but lies without a grain of truth in them . . . We prisoners of war who fell into the hands of the Jewish forces declare that we are given the best of treatment . . We are not only treated according to the provisions of international law, but are given better treatment than that provided by law.'

No aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been more hotly debated than the causes of the flight of the Palestinians. While Arabs claim the refugees were expelled, the Israelis allege that Arab leaders ordered them to leave their homes provisionally so that the Arab attack on Israel could roll forward unhampered. Erskine Childers, one of the most persuasive  exponents of the Arab cause, maintained (The Spectator, 12.5.61) that a thorough search of monitored broadcasts failed to reveal: ` a single order or appeal, or suggestion about evacuation from Palestine from any Arab radio station, inside or outside Palestine, in 1948 '. Contrary to Childers' assertion, three Arab radio stations did broadcast messages which seemed to imply an official request to Palestinians to abandon their homesteads temporarily.20

After the Arab defeat in Tiberias, Sharq al Adna (20.4.48) announced that King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan had ordered `Arab forces to be sent immediately to Tiberias to evacuate Arab refugee families '. Two days later, following the Jewish victory at Haifa, the same station suggested the existence of a plan when it reported:    `Simultaneously the Arabs have started to evacuate this market area by sending women and children by sea to Acre.' Radio Damascus (26.4.48), discussing the battle of Jaffa, was even more explicit:


`Arab reinforcements arrive continuously in defence of the town, from which women and children are being evacuated.'

Further evidence is lacking because of the small number of broadcasts actually monitored.

Childers' claim that the BBC monitored ' a11 Middle Eastern broadcasts throughout 1948 ', has been contradicted by the assistant editor of the monitoring service, who stated in a letter to the author (16.12.70): 'No one could ever claim to have monitored every single broadcast . . . Only a selection from what is actually listened to is transcribed, and only a selection of what is actually transcribed is published.'
Another of Mr. Childers' assertions, that no Jewish station ` so much as hinted at any Arab evacuation orders ', does not tally with the record. When Arab broadcasts admitted the evacuation of Arab villages, the Haganah took up the subject and blamed the exodus on the invading Arab irregulars. On 21 April it accused `Arab gangs ' (the Haganah term for Arab irregulars) of being responsible for the evacuation of Arab villages. On 23 April it mentioned and criticized the ' evacuation of all Arab inhabitants [from Tiberias ? ] by order of the Arab higher authorities'. On 5 May, it also drew attention to the plight of the villagers of
Sarafand who wanted to postpone their evacuation until their crops had been harvested.  The British were also blamed for the Arab exodus. The 'Voice of Israel (9.11.48) asked the Arabs to remember ' that it was the British who advised them to evacuate the Arab  population  from the areas about to be occupied by Israeli forces '.

Mr. Childers also contends that repeated ` stay-put ' orders were issued by Arab stations. An A1 Inqaz broadcast of 24 April threatening severe punishment to those who deserted is usually quoted to substantiate this argument. However, on the previous day--the same day, it will be recalled, on which the Haganah commented on orders to evacuate Arab inhabitants--Al Inqaz
defiantly announced ` no-one will remain [in Haifa] to accept Jewish conditions '. It would be difficult to interpret this broadcast as anything but a call to leave. Any 'stay-put ' orders, therefore, apparently referred to territories outside the battle zone, whereas area: within it or on the verge of surrender were to be evacuated.

An Iraqi parliamentary investigating commission assigned to report on the 1948 war later shed some light on this subject. A section entitled 'Decisions of the Lebanon Sofar Committee '   (composed    of    Arab    League representatives), made the following recommendation: ` The committee advises Arab governments to open their doors to accept Arab children,women and older people from Palestine and care for them-should events in Palestine require it.' 21

Any examination of Arab broadcasts can leave the reader in little doubt that their incessant atrocity propaganda accusing the Jews of indiscriminate massacres must have contributed to, if it did not actually cause, the Arab flight from Palestine. Radio Damascus (16.2.48) accused Jews of murdering five children in their beds, while Radio Beirut (13.3.48)    accused   Zionists    of    terrorism  culminating in the shedding of innocent blood.

The massacre theme became a mainstay of Arab propaganda. On 14 April, Radio Damascus proclaimed that such tragedies as had occurred at Deir Yasin were only to be expected. A day later, Sharq al Adna alleged that Jews had fiendishly tortured the inhabitants of Deir Yasin, a deed by which ` Zionists  have proved their intention to exterminate the Arabs . . . '    This propaganda campaign based on horror was further intensified after when 15 May  when the armies of the neighbouring  Arab states marched into Palestine. Radio Al Inqaz (18.5.48) frightened its listeners with  tales of Arab corpses discovered in a Jewish village    ' shot    through    the    head    and    with  savagely mutilated bodies '.  On 15 June, when , the ceasefire was already in force. Radio Cairo accused the Israelis of attacking the houses of peaceful Arabs.    Once inside, it was alleged„ - they ` did not hesitate to kill women and children '.    As late as 2 August, Radio Beirut  was broadcasting a statement by Assam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, as follows: 

` The Jewish authorities responsible for the security of non-combatants encourage massacre, extermination, deportation, looting and expropriation. Zionists have put the  clock of civilized behaviour back hundreds of years and are now reverting to the


savageries and bestialities practised by Huns and Vandals.'

Radio Damascus (13.9.48) was responsible for what was perhaps the most damaging and vicious  calumny when it asserted that a UN report had confirmed the slaughter of 20,000 Arabs by Zionists, when, on the contrary, the report actually emphasized that ` no evidence was found to support claims of massacre and capture '.22 The impact of these atrocity stories on simple, bewildered and frightened people was entirely predictable; the Palestinian Arabs, fearing for their lives, fled in panic. Kenneth Bilby, the New York Herald Tribune correspondent, speaking of the Arab flight from Jaffa, gives the following account:

` During the truce, Dr. Yussef Haikel, the forty year old mayor . . . told me that hundreds of Arab men and women had been trapped in the Manshieh and then ruthlessly slaughtered by the Jews. I never found the slightest shred of evidence to support this contention and I examined Manshieh carefully just after the battle. But the fact was that Haikel's story had spread like sagefire among the Arabs of Jaffa and they needed no urging to get out.' 23

Jewish radio stations, it has been  asserted, were also trying to spread panic and confusion among the Arabs. Erskine Childers mentions in this context that an Irgun broadcast of  27 March warned the Arabs of the risk of  typhus and cholera epidemics. The actual broadcast merely advised them to get inoculated because these diseases were spreading. Arab radio stations from 1947 onwards had been apprehensive of an outbreak of epidemics which they later said, had become endemic throughout the Arab world and Palestine.24 A broadcast by Jerusalem Radio (22.12.47) casts an interesting sidelight on the epidemic scare. It stated that travellers arriving from Syria needed inoculation certificates. However, since the guerillas who crossed the frontier three weeks later would scarcely have heeded these provisions, it may have been they who actually  brought the disease to Palestine.

Mr. Childers contends that Jewish radio stations contributed their share to the Arab exodus by focusing attention on the flight and panic of Arabs.25 Interestingly, none of these broadcasts have been quoted in sufficient detail to allow the reader to appreciate the point they were trying to make, namely that the Arab panic was caused by Arab irregulars. The looting of Arab shops in Jaffa by Iraqi soldiers, described at some length by Radio Haganah (5.5.48) was confirmed by the London Economist (2.10.48): ` The Iraqis and Syrians . . .seized a chance to loot locally, particularly in Christian Arab houses and then make a getaway with their spoils.' John Glubb, the commander of the Arab Legion, was somewhat ambivalent in his attitude to what he regarded as strange bedfellows; to him they were just ` bandits and enthusiasts.' 26 SimilarIy, a leading Palestinian, Nimr al Hawari, and the Iraqi Parliamentary Investigating Commission confirm that the irregulars frequently prevented Palestinians from taking part in the battle, accusing them of being Israeli spies. According to Nimr al Khatib, an Arab writer, the explanation is that

` Most of the volunteers [in Jaffa] treated the local population as defeated; they collected their arms and sold them; confiscated their cars and sold them too. Things came to such a pass that people were more afraid of their defenders than of the Jews.27

The various Jewish radio stations in their Arab broadcasts predictably repudiated allegations of deliberate outrage, but, not so predictably in view of what has been accepted as a Zionist policy objective, they also tried to persuade the Arabs to stay. The BBC mentioned in the preface to its monitored broadcasts (March 1948) that ` the Arabs were told that the Jews intended to set up a democratic government in their territory with fair representation for the Arabs' and that ` the Jews' sympathy with the Arabs in general and their desire to co-operate were featured in many of Haganah's Arabic transmissions '. On 6 April, Radio Haganah, emphasizing Jewish goodwill, asserted: ` It is not strange to see Jewish forces protect Arab belongings ', and on 24 April it appealed:

`Arabs, we do not wish to harm you . . . we only want to live in peace...Be assured that through Arab-Jewish co-operation miracles can be achieved...Our


present appeal comes from the bottom of our hearts, truly and faithfully.'

These broadcasts continued after the Arab invasion of 15 May, The Voice of Israel {25.7.48) asked Arabs not to delay registration which would enable each family to draw its full ration allowance. Even as late as 11 November, it still promised that Arabs ` who remain in the State of Israel can be certain the government will look after them and take care of their interests '.

Another approach used by the Israeli propaganda services was to warn Palestinians of the fate awaiting them if they fled to their Arab neighbours; Egypt, Radio Haganah alleged, was threatened by famine. On the eve of the Arab invasion (14.5.48), Radio Haganah contrasted the introduction of martial law in Arab countries with the abrogation in Israel of all legislation restricting the freedom of speech. Propaganda along this line was stepped up during and after the first ceasefire (11 June to 8 July). The Voice of Israel (?2.6.48). for instance. enlarged on the treatment meted out to refugees by Syria and a month later (21 July) it accused the Iraqis of compelling local peasants to man front line defences against their will. Reverting to the ` unwanted refugee ' theme, the Voice of Israel (22.7.48) reported that refugees thronging the streets  of   Beirut   had  shouted.    ` We  are hungry', and suggested (4.8.48) that ` no-one in Arab countries wants to harbour refugees '. Still plugging this  line. it commented (26 November) on rallies of Palestinian refugees in Syria demonstrating for better rations.

If, according to some historians of the 1948 war, Israeli attitudes towards Palestinian Arabs changed from first desiring them to stay to finally wanting to be rid of them, such a change is certainly not reflected in Israel's Arab language broadcasts. They continued to compare the Arab's assured position under Israeli law with the hardships and deprivations he would encounter as an unwelcome refugee in neighbouring countries: Nor did Arab propaganda deviate
from its original approach; it continued to retail vile atrocities allegedly committed by Jews and to outline the terrible disasters which were soon to overtake them. The choice presented to the Palestinians by this kind of propaganda, of either being massacred by implacable enemies or starved to death by besieging friends, was not designed to persuade them to stay.

1. All references to radio broadcasts are taken from the Daily Report of the Central Intelligence Agency`s Federal Broadcasting Branch and British Broadcasting Corporation's  Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV.
2. Radio Beirut. 14 October 1947.
3. Robert John and Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diary (New York, 1970), Vol. n, pp. 282-283. The chairman of the committee was Iraq's General Ismail Safwat Pasha.
4. Radio Beirut 22 October 1947.
S. On 16 December 1947 The New York Times reported that trained Palestinians from Syria had slipped back across the frontier. On 2 December the same newspaper had stated that each month about 400-500 men had been undergoing military training in Damascus for the past five months. It would be reasonable to assume that many of these volunteers were Syrian.
6. 1 Ibid, 4 December 1947.
7. On 29 January Radio Baghdad announced that 3,000 Arabs were readyto cross into Palestine to ' launch a bitter fight for rescuing Palestine. It will surpass all other battles by its severity. '
8. John Glubb  A  Soldier With The Arabs (New York: Harper, 1958); see also Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab- Israeli War, 1948 (New  York: Praeger. 1957). p. 35.
9. Radio Cairo 15 December. 1948
10. On ex-Germans fighting for the Arabs see also the Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 January 1948,. No. 35; p. 61  , Radio Cairo, 19 February 1948.
11. See O'Ballance, p. 78; George Kirk, The Middle East 1945-50 (London, 1954), p. 282, note 2; see also Sharq al Adna 30 March 1943.
12. Radio Damascus. 23 December 1947 and 6 May 1948 also he proposal made by the Egyptian Minister of War;  Summary of World Broadcasts. 28 January 1948; and Sharq al Adna - 14 February, 1948.
13.    A/532, p.  10
14. Up to 15 May  the Voice of Israel had been known as Haganah Radio.
15. Sharq al Adna 7 June 1948.
16. Most Arab stations during this period did not differentiate between a Zionist and a Jew.
17. Radio Cairo 3 December 1947; 19 January 1948; Sharq al Adna 8 December, 1947; 4 June 1948; see also New York Times 6 June 1948 and Radio Damascus, 13 December 1947.
18. Sharq al Adna  7 June 1948.
19. Haganah Radio. 4, 8 April 1948.
20. These are reproduced in the Daily Report but not in the Summary of World Broadcasts.
21. A Hebrew version of the report, was published in 1954 under the title of Me Ahorei ha
Pargod (From Behind the Curtain). Addendum 8• pp. 49-50.
22. UN document S/934, 28 July 1948.    `
23. Kenneth    Bilby,    New    Star    in    the    East (New  York:  Doubleday, 1950), p. 30.
24. See e.g. Sharq al Adna, 16 October, 6 November 1947; Radio Cairo, 8 August 1948; Radio Beirut, 9 August 1948. 
25. Erskine Childers, ' The Other Exodus ', The Spectator, 12  May 1961.
26. Glubb, p. 79.   
27. As a Result of the Catastrophe [in Arabic], P. 33 quoted in Gabbay; A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict (Geneva, 1959), p. 92.


Zimmerman, J. (1973/1974). Radio propaganda in the Arab-Israeli war 1948. Weiner
Library Bulletin, 30/31, 2-8


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